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Private financial transfers are becoming more and more important as ageing levels increase
in Europe, with elders acting as both givers and receivers. Our study is divided in two
main parts. In the first part we analyse the determinants of private financial transfers,
using the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). In the second
part we analyse the importance of family values for these transfers, combining SHARE
with European Values Study. We show that family functions as the main agent of private
transfers. We conclude that family values drive financial transfers, mainly gifts provided
by elderly individuals. We find that receipts by old-aged people are more related with need
cases, such as illness and poorness; moreover, for these particular cases, family network
plays a very important role, working as a safety net.
When I get older losing my hair
Many years from now (. . . )
Will you still need me, will you still feed me
When I’m sixty-four?
— The Beatles, When I’m Sixty-Four,
in Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band (1967)
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Figure 1: Relevance of the words ‘Ageing’ and ‘Demography’ on publications
1 Introduction
In this new century Europe faces many challenges; it can be easily pointed out that ageing
is one of the sharpest, and it came to stay. Simultaneously, the region is facing a huge debt
crisis: in this moment explicit government debt in the EU stands on average at 90 percent.
Two clearly distinct challenges that, nonetheless, are mutually dependent: in fact, when
analysing public debt, it is important to take into consideration ageing (Borsch-Supan,
Brandt, Litwin and Weber, 2013).
Ageing is clearly becoming more and more a worry for Europe. Figure 1 shows the
increasing relative presence of the words “ageing” and “demography” on published books
since 1800): a new theme, which was born on the XX century, but has gained increasing
importance.
Pensions, health systems and long-term care are covered only on a small part by older
generation’s savings; they rely mostly on taxes borne by current active population and debt
(Borsch-Supan et al., 2013). This creates an enormous problem: in the future the share
of elderly population will be greater than it is today, and the share of active population
will be smaller, thus generating a discrepancy that makes the system imbalanced.
It is expected that ageing will have a great impact on family relations and on inter-
generational private transfers, as Mudrazija (2014) refers:
“knowledge on the overall flow of transfers between family generations
across life cycle, and their link with welfare regimes is still limited. (. . . )
In an era of population ageing, when governments find it increasingly difficult
to maintain current levels of support to both younger and older populations,
uncovering the mechanisms that link public and private streams of intergener-
ational support becomes particularly important.”
Hoffmann and Rodrigues (2010) predicted that in the next years, there will be a significant
increase in the number and average age of informal helpers in Europe.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the main drivers of intergenerational private
transfers received and given by elderly individuals. The study comprises three main parts.
The first is an analysis of the determinants of inward and outward private financial trans-
fers.1 The second is a characterization of the importance of one’s family on one’s social
1Some decades ago the flow of financial transfers was mainly upwards. In our days downward transfers
became much more frequent, possibly due to the setting up of welfare systems (Attias-Donfut, 1995; Kohli,
1999).
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network. Interestingly, we show that children are more important when one is less healthy,
older, poorer, or less educated. Thirdly, we relate family values to private financial trans-
fers. We use the European Value Study to construct an Index of Family Values per country.
We then use this index in various forms to show that indeed transfers are related to family
values. This is an important relation, mainly because we live in a time of change, where
the concept of family is being altered. As Albertini and Garriga (2010) pointed out: peo-
ple have less children today and divorce rates all over Europe increased. It is possible that
these changes have implications for family transfers, and it is thus interesting to study the
relationship between values and private financial transfers.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in the next Section, we present a
brief literature review. Section 3 discusses the data sources, together with the method-
ology. Section 4 presents a preliminary look at the data, which includes the descriptive
statistics, and a characterisation of the relative importance of children on social networks
according to the age, income, education, and health status of the individuals. We analyse
the determinants of private financial transfers in Section 5. Section 6 sheds light on the
relationship between family values and transfers. Finally, we provide some conclusions
and directions for further research on Section 7.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Private Transfers’ Benefits and Drivers
Downward financial transfers provide the means for young adults to extend their education
and also to establish their independence (Attias-Donfut, Ogg and Wolff, 2005). Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1993) found that parental support is highly significant for their young-adult
children, namely during periods of education or unemployment.
Downward private transfers have also benefits for elderly individuals, because they
work as a means for older people to remain active and to feel useful to the society (Abdulaze
and Sakkeus, 2013).
Both downward and upward intergenerational transfers have a positive impact on
individual well-being (see, for example, Roll and Litwin (2013)). Albuquerque (2014)
showed that intergenerational private transfers work as a safety net and as a way of
reinforcing the bonds across different generations. Cornwell and Waite (2009) showed
that the size of social networks is one of the most relevant determinants of well-being.
Deindl, Hank and Brandt (2013) suggested that people with poor health conditions
are more likely to reside in closer geographic proximity to those in the personal network
who are able to help. Abdulaze et al. (2013) showed also that usually physical limita-
tions are related with more geographical proximity with the social network, and a closer
social network is related with more financial transfers (in both directions); however severe
physical limitations are negatively correlated with the network size (ibidem). Besides in-
dividual advantages, there are also social and state level benefits. Private financial and
time transfers between generations may represent a very significant relief for State budget
(Brugiavini, Buia, Pasini and Zantomio, 2013). Due to the increasing problem of ageing,
with governments having difficulties to maintain the actual levels of support to pensions
systems (Mudrazija, 2014), private transfers may work as a very important complement
to State intervention.
Governments in Europe increased their expenditure on health during the last years,
and we expect that this spending will increase with ageing (Borsch-Supan et al., 2013).
Individual relations are a key factor to mitigate this negative effect. Borsch-Supan and
2
Schuth (2013) showed that there might be a positive relation between a larger social
network and better cognitive abilities, higher subjective well-being and less depression.
They argue that “social isolation diminishes the day-to-day challenges that keep people
mentally fit and well because, ultimately, human beings are social entities.”
Geographical proximity plays a very important role on determining the intensity and
the frequency of financial networks (Albertini et al., 2010). However in this case there is
a problem of inverse causality, since parents may want live closer to their children, due to
their already deep relation with them (the same may happen in a minor scale with friends).
Consequently, it is possible that this deep relation is the main factor that benefits financial
transfers, and not the geographical proximity by itself.
Besides geographical proximity, early retirement has on average a huge negative impact
on the size of the social networks. Borsch-Supan et al. (2013) find evidence “that retire-
ment in general, and early retirement in particular, reduces the size of the social network,
and in particular the number of friends and other non-family contacts in the interpersonal
milieu (and not only the number of immediate colleagues)”. Age plays an important role
in financial transfers. Mudrazija (2014) shows that net transfers are negatively correlated
with age. However the relation is not linear. When parents are younger than 70 there is
a moderate decline in parent-child dyads; when their age is in the 70-79 interval there is
a sharp decline; after 80 years old, the decline continues, but more moderately again (the
same pattern was suggested by Cox, Eser and Jimenez (1998)).
There are important complementarities and differences between the behaviours of fi-
nancial and time supports, such that parents are more likely to give financial support to
children than to receive it from them. However, parents aged 70 and older were more
likely to receive than to provide time support, excluding grandchild care (Albertini and
Kohli, 2012; Albertini, Kohli and Vogel, 2007). Nevertheless, in what concerns receiving
time support, Attias-Donfut et al. (2005) found that the likelihood of being a receiver
substantially increases with age, namely after 75. Bonsang (2009) found that time and
money transfers can act as substitutes.
2.2 Culture matters — Differences in Countries
Stoeckel and Litwin (2013) suggest that values depend from country to country, and
that these differences have an explicit impact on the structure of family relations and
on the behaviour of intergenerational transfers. In Southern Europe the role of family is
particularly important, and in these countries intergenerational solidarity is stronger. For
example: Portugal, Spain and Italy have a higher likelihood of having children in their
social networks (ibidem).
Shiovitz-Ezra (2013) using the same data base than Stoeckel et al. (2013) (the fourth
wave of SHARE, also used on our research) finds an apparently contradictory aspect:
In Southern countries, which have a more family orientation and where people are less
individualistic, there is a higher prevalence of loneliness within the elder population, than
in Northern countries. There is a possible explanation for this contradiction, since in
societies where is given more value to family there are larger expectations for intense
relations, and the lack of response to these expectations (which are higher for conservative
societies) conduces to feelings of loneliness, which may be particularly sensed by elder
people (Johnson and Mullins, 1987).
This is a complex and relatively recent problem, thus knowledge on the causes and
consequences of financial intergenerational transfers between agents, and their link with
welfare regimes is still limited (Mudrazija, 2014). However, differences on welfare systems
characteristics have an enormous impact on the nature, direction, timing and intensity
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Figure 2: Family Members on Social Network
of family transfers (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This represents a clear limitation to analyse
the impact of values on private transfers, because values affect public transfers, and public
transfers affect private transfers.
Policy-makers have to take into account the effects produced by public transfers. Mu-
drazija (2014) refers that: “It appears that the magnitude of welfare regime redistribution
of resources from working-age to dependent populations is negatively associated with the
magnitude of intergenerational family redistribution. Therefore, while public transfers do
not displace family intergenerational giving, they may decrease the relative importance of
family giving for life-cycle consumption smoothing.”
However it is interesting to note that there are significant differences in the age/net
transfers pattern across the welfare regimes. For example in traditional countries net
transfers tend to decrease faster with age than in social democratic countries (ibidem).
2.3 The Importance of Family
When we consider intergenerational private transfers the literature unanimously points
out that family plays the major role. Stoeckel et al. (2013) showed that, in Europe, 62%
of the elderly individuals with one or more confidants reported having a social network
constituted exclusively by family members. And that 85% of elderly individuals with one
or more confidants have a social network mostly constituted by family members. Only
8% had no family members in their network. Figure 2 displays these different shares for
individuals that have ate least one member on their social network, showing the weight of
family members (FM) on the social networks.
Stoeckel et al. (2013) find that an extended social network implied higher levels of
satisfaction within the network; nonetheless when family does not constitute the majority
of the members of the social network, there were lower levels of satisfaction.
Transfers are more frequent when there are more family members in the social net-
work. Albuquerque (2014) analyses the Portuguese case, showing that family-based rela-
tions permit the existence of an informal, but strong and constant care regime. Familiar
intergenerational transfers act as a safety net, providing income, practical assistance and
home. Family plays an important role in guaranteeing assistance to other generations
dealing with crisis and unpredictable events and also providing ever-lasting needs. Family
members, and in particular adult children, are the main care providers for elderly individ-
uals, who have severe limitations in performing daily activities (Kalwij, Alessie and Knoef,
2013). Thus, informal care provision increases satisfaction within the social network and
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it may decrease public long-term care expenditure.
Albuquerque (2014) suggested that family relations may work as an informal care
network, since there is a positive correlation between financial gifts from children and
time transfers to children.
Mudrazija (2014) shows that family will always play an important role upon inter-
generational support, independently from State intervention, because “public transfers do
not displace family intergenerational giving: they may increase the relative importance
of family giving for life-cycle consumption smoothing.” Family based support is a key
factor for the sustainability of long-term care systems in Europe. There is an extensive
list of externalities related with family time and money transfers. For example, childcare
provision by grandparents reduces the cost of raising children, and it also encourages adult
labour participation on the market (Brugiavini et al., 2013). Additionally, Hoffmann et al.
(2010) showed that family is also a very relevant source of informal care for older relatives,
representing an important reduction for State health expenditures (Craveiro, Matos, Silva,
Martinez-Pecino and Schouten, 2013).
Today families have fewer children, and there are significant differences on parent-child
relations. The family structure is being transformed and these changes have inevitably
impacts on the behaviour of financial and time transfers (Attias-Donfut et al., 2005).
Population ageing, low fertility rates and high divorce rate create many concerns about
the inclusion, welfare and well-being of actual and future elderly population: mainly for
the poorest, lowest educated and most physically limited groups (Albertini et al., 2010).
Alessie, Angelini and Pasini (2011) have shown that altruism matters for long term care
provision and intergenerational financial transfers. Attias-Donfut et al. (2005) suggested
that: “individuals whose behaviour is generous, altruistic or charitable are likely to increase
their propensity to transfer resources to other family members”.
Religious values also influence the number of children per family (as data on EVS
shows), Albuquerque (2014) showed that people with more children help more their par-
ents.
Divorce rates may also be an indicator of individual values. Albertini et al. (2010)
showed that divorce, controlling for income and wealth, has long-term negative effects
on the intensity and frequency of intergenerational relations. Stronger family values con-
tribute, on average, for more intense family transfers, and it may be that divorce signalizes
weaker family values, and by consequence less parent-child time and financial transfers.
Values may also influence women participation in the labour market. Attias-Donfut et
al. (2005) pointed out that the increasing share of women present in the labour market has
considerable consequences for financial and time transfers within the social networks. Blau
and Currie (2006) showed that elder individuals, that provide grandchild care, contribute
to influence labour market outcomes associated with fertility decisions, encouraging women
participation in the labour market and contributing to increase the fertility rate. However,
there is a contradictory effect, on children’s care, when it is provided by parents or by
younger grandparents. In these cases, long-term care by adults may have a negative impact
on women participation on the labour market(Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Bolin, Lindgren
and Lundborg, 2008).
Abdulaze et al. (2013) point out that the increasing individualism on the European
society, conjugated with ageing, creates weaker relations across different generations and
affects negatively family ties. They also show higher education levels are correlated with
having more friends in social network.
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3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data Sources
Our study has two main parts. The first is the analysis of the determinants of private fi-
nancial transfers, using the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE)
2012 wave. This is an individual-level analysis. The second is the importance of family
values for these transfers, and combines both the SHARE data and the European Values
Study (EVS) 2008 wave. This part is done at the country level. Indeed, despite the fact
that both SHARE and EVS are extensive individual-level databases, they use different
samples. We thus use the EVS to construct a family values index for each of the six-
teen European countries in the SHARE database, which we then (i) relate to the country
fixed effects estimated in the first part; and (ii), use directly in the regression of private
transfers, substituting the country dummies. We also use interaction terms between the
family values index and other variables to test whether or not family values mediate the
relationship between private transfers and some of its covariates.
SHARE collects information on individuals aged 50 and older. SHARE’s first wave was
in 2005, the second in 2008, the third in 2010, and the forth in 2012. This survey covers
many different areas such as ageing, health, cognitive functions, activities, consumption
patterns, intergenerational solidarity, social networks, household income, employment,
pensions, life expectations and life satisfaction. It is built upon a very extensive, complete
and reliable questionnaire, which is answered by each person during an interview made
by a professional. This permits to collect a very complete, detailed and rich individual
characterization.
The forth wave (the one that we use in this paper) collects data from 16 different coun-
tries (Austria, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Switzer-
land, Belgium, Israel, Czech Republic, Poland, Ireland, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and
Portugal), from more than 65.000 individuals (all older than 50), including their spouses.
Such a wide questionnaire, built on many individuals from different countries, makes this
survey a very useful tool to analyse the relationship between ageing, individual behaviour,
and social relationships. This represents an enormous help for policy-makers in Europe,
as ageing is becoming more and more an issue (Table 1).
The survey is harmonized with U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS), with English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) and with The Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(TILDA). SHARE is coordinated by Axel Borsch-Supan, at the Munich Center for the
Economics of Ageing (MEA). In our work we examine country fixed effects, which will in a
small part be affected by different samples designs within countries, since SHARE does not
have a uniform sampling design. The survey makes a calibration approach for adjusting
the sample weights compensated unit non-response. In most countries, this calibration
was made to national population totals decomposed by age and gender.
We also use data from the European Value Studies fourth wave, which is a standard-
ized questionnaire, that started in 1981 and from then it is repeated every nine years. We
have data from four different waves: 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008. There are 47 European
countries/regions participating in the fourth wave, on a total of about 70.000 interviews.
The program depends on the EVS Foundation, from which the highest authority is the
Council of Program Directors. The EVS project focuses mainly on basic human values,
which is an area that SHARE does not cover. This large-scale, cross-national and lon-
gitudinal survey covers areas such as religion, family values, politics, society views, life
and work. The questions presented in the questionnaire aim at understanding the beliefs,
the preferences, the values, the opinions, the attitudes and the ideas of citizens all over
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Europe.
The comparison of the four existent waves permits to conclude that we are living
in Europe a time of fast and vertiginous changes2. Our culture is suffering a profound
transformation, mainly in what refers to family and religious values3. This change is
happening in almost every country at different velocities4.
3.2 The Determinants of Financial Transfers
We choose SHARE’s fourth wave, because it collects data on transfers between the respon-
dents and their relatives. Individuals report the inward and outward financial transfers
in the 12 months prior to the interview. Respondents were asked on the interview: “Not
counting any shared housing or shared food, have you or your husband/wife/partner re-
ceived/given any financial or material gift from/to anyone inside or outside this household
amounting to 250 euros or more?”
The questionnaire considers only up to 3 gifts and/or receipts. The interviewer clarified
that “financial or material gift” corresponds to “giving/receiving money”, or covering
specific types of costs such as those for medical care or insurance, schooling and down
payment for a home. Loans were not considered gifts.
The data thus gives us the number of financial transfers higher than 250 euros, but not
the total amounts involved. We thus cannot tell if people are net givers or net receivers,
only if they engaged in private financial transfers in both directions. Therefore one model
is built separately for given and received financial transfers.
For this reason we opt to use two probit models5 (each of them with five different
regressions), where the response variable is a dummy. On the first model, the response
variable is equal to 1 if the person is a giver and 0 otherwise; and on the second model,
the response variable is equal to 1 if the person is a receiver and 0 otherwise.
A probit model is an econometric model in which the response variable yi can be or 0
or 1, and the explanatory variable xi is estimated in: Pr (yi) = 1 = F (x
′
ib) where F is the
univariate normal distribution function.
We choose to report the marginal effects on the means per variable, because coefficients
in a probit model do not have a linear relation with the dependent variable. We follow the
suggestion by Nagler (1994): “The simplest technique used to present probit estimates is
to set each independent variable to its mean (or mode for discrete variables), and show
the effect on Pr (yi) = 1 as the independent variables vary one at a time.” Then we show
the significances per variable with Z values.
The social network module in SHARE fourth wave also collects data on the charac-
teristics of the individual’s social network. We concentrated on the distinction between
family members and friends inside the social network. We considered as elements of family
network parents, siblings, children and grandchildren. Spouses were excluded, since they




5When the independent variable is dichotomous OLS does not provide an efficient estimation. See
Aldrich and Nelson (1986), that show that if the independent variable is binary, the variance of the
disturbance term is not constant, which brings a problem of heteroskedasticity, where the estimates of
the standard errors becomes invalid. Other problem arose by Nagler (1994) it is that OLS may create
estimations with a probability higher than 1 and lower than 0, which have no possible interpretation.
Nagler (1994) points that: “The Probit model constrains the estimated probabilities to be between 0 and
1, and relaxes the constraint that the effect of independent variables is constant across different predicted
values of the dependent variable.”
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The questionnaire distinguishes a person as a social network member considering the
answer to the following question “Over the last 12 months, who are the people with whom
you most often discussed important things?” Survey participants were permitted to list
up to six names, and one additional name of a person important for them for any reason
(this implies a maximum of seven people).
For each probit model (for givers and receivers) we estimate the following specifications:
• In the first regression we include as explanatory variables famnet (number of fa-
miliars in the social network); friendnet (number of friends in the social network);
married (which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is married and equal
to 0 otherwise) and gender (which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the person is
female and equal to 0 otherwise).
• In the second regression we add country dummies, using Austria as the reference
one.
• In the third regression we control for income (the sum of pensions, health pensions,
employment wages, self-employment wages, lump sum payments, income from rent
and sublet and other regular payments)6; education (years of education); symptoms
(number of symptoms reported last year) and age.
• In the fourth regression we substitute famnet by childnet (the number of children
present in the social network), for robustness purposes.
On Tables 4 and 5 we present the Z-scores, which are the effects on a cumulative
normal function of the probabilities that the independent variable is equal to one, and
the marginal effects, which provide a good approximation to the amount of change in the
response variable that will be produced by a 1 unit change in the explanatory variable.
In this case, the increase in the probability of being a giver, or a receiver, when the
explanatory variable increases by 1 unit.
We use the number of symptoms as an indicator of personal health status. It does not
say everything about physical condition, because it refers the number of symptoms and
not its severity; however this need not be a problem, since generally more severe illnesses
deteriorate health and augments the propensity for having more symptoms. We have a
wide plot of answers from 0 to 13 (approximately 24% of the individuals answered 0). Our
position is strengthened by the fact that symptoms are closely related with other health-
variables in SHARE, such as memory condition, number of days spent on the hospital last
month and mobility capacity (see Appendix 3).
3.3 Family Values
We aim at studying the impact of family values on private financial transfers. With this
objective, we use the EVS to compute an index of family values per country. We use the
following question: “Do you think that marriage is outdated?” There are only two possible
answers: agree or disagree. Then we create a dummy based on this question equal to 1 for
disagreeing, and equal to 0 otherwise. EVS offers a great variety of questions regarding
values, we choose this one since it is the only yes/no question addressing directly family
values that is covered by all the sixteen countries analysed in our study.
We then compute the mean value per country (see Table 5) and obtain the Family
Values Index (FVI). With the FVI we are able to relate the 16 countries that form part
6The results do not change if instead of income we use wealth as an explanatory variable.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Unit
Giver 0,28 0,45 0 1 Dummy equal to 1 when individual
made an outward transfer of more than
250 euros in the last 12 months
Receiver 0,19 0,39 0 1 Dummy equal to 1 when individual re-
ceived an inward transfer of more than
250 euros in the last 12 months
Childnet 0,80 0,98 0 7 Number of children on the social net-
work
Famnet 1,86 1,35 0 7 Number of family members on the so-
cial network
Friendnet 0,45 0,86 0 7 Number of friends on the social network
Married 0,73 0,45 0 1 Dummy equal to 1 when the individual
is married
Gender 0,57 0,50 0 1 Dummy equal to 1 when the individual
is a female
Income 15.168 23.444 0 627.229 Euros (annual income)
Yeduc 10,26 4,54 0 25 Years of education
Symptoms 2,01 2,03 0 13 Number of symptoms last year
Age 65,88 10,39 24 111 Years
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Data Set
on SHARE fourth wave and examine if there is a relation between our values index and on
the probability on elder individuals engaging in financial private transfer either as givers
or as receivers. Importantly, the EVS fourth wave is from 2008 and the SHARE fourth
wave is from 2012. We are thus assuming that values are a quite stable feature that do
not change significantly over these four years.
Both SHARE and EVS are individual level databases but with different samples. This
forces us to rely on a country-level analysis, under the assumption that personal values
are very attached to country values. We make two graphical analysis, one for givers and
the other for receivers, where we cross the sixteen country FVI with the country marginal
effects obtained in our 3rd regression. In order see if differences in countries behaviours
on generating private financial transfers are related with the importance of family values
We use the FVI directly in the probit regressions, where each individual is assigned
with the FVI of his country. We also analyse the interactions between our index and our ex-
planatory variables famnet, friendnet, married, gender, income, eduction, symptomns
and age, comparing with the results obtained in the first part.
4 Preliminary Data Analysis
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics.7 Country weights on our total observations
are described in Table 2.
7We have 1.226 individuals that are aged less than 50, these individuals are part of our observations
because they are married with people that are aged above 50 and took part in the survey.
9
SHARE EVS
Country Observations Percentage Observations Percentage
Austria 5286 9% 1510 6,2%
Germany 1572 2,7% 2075 8,5%
Sweden 1951 3,3% 1187 4,9%
Netherlands 2762 4,7% 1554 6,4%
Spain 3570 6,1% 1500 6,1%
Italy 3583 6,1% 1519 6,2%
France 5857 10% 1501 6,1%
Denmark 2276 3,9% 1507 6,2%
Switzerland 3750 6,4% 1272 5,2%
Belgium 5300 9,1% 1509 6,2%
Czech 6118 10,5% 1821 7,5%
Poland 1724 2,9% 1510 6,2%
Hungary 3076 5,3% 1513 6,2%
Portugal 2080 3,6% 1553 6,4%
Slovenia 2756 4,7% 1366 5,6%
Estonia 6828 11,7% 1518 6,2%
Total 58489 100% 24415 100%
Table 2: Country weight on data
4.2 The Role of Children in the Social Network
The width of social network is intrinsically related with the intensity and frequency of
private financial transfers (Stoeckel et al., 2013). However, not only size matters. Family
network and friend network play different roles.
Money receipts by the older population are essentially related with need cases, such
as low income positions or health problems (Attias-Donfut et al., 2005). In these cases
family is of utmost importance, because it works as the natural support for extreme cases
(Mudrazija, 2014).
We characterise the importance of the family in one’s social network depending on
one’s age, health status, income and education. We construct binscatters to analyse these
relations, binscatters provide a non-parametric method of plotting the conditional expec-
tation function, they describe the average y-value for equal groups of x-value. Binscatters
also provide “the best linear fit line, constructed from an OLS regession of the y-residuals
on the x-residuals. The slope of the fit line matches the coefficient of the multivariate
regression.”8
Figure 3 relates health condition (measured by the number of symptoms) with the
percentage of children in the social network. It shows that as individuals’ health deteri-
orates, children represent a higher percentage of total social network. (We controlled for
age, since it is highly related with both variables, and here we want to highlight the effect
of health in the social network constitution9.
There is also a clear gradient when it comes to education and Income: more educated
8Michael Stepner, Binscatter, a stata programm to generate binned scaterplots, on https://
michaelstepner.com/binscatter/.
9“Binscatter provides built-in options to control for covariates before plotting the relationship, and can
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Source: SHARE 4th wave, n=58.489
Figure 4: Social Network and Education
people tend to have more friends and more family members in their social network, but the
effect of education is clearly stronger in increasing the number of friends than on increasing
family members. This happens because family ties have other important drivers not related
with education, as we will further explain.
In Figure 4 it is possible to see the strong negative effect that more years of education
have on the percentage of children in the social network, since education improves mainly
the number of friends in the social network (see Appendix).
The relationship between income and the percentage of children in the social network
is displayed in Figure 5. This graph strongly supports the evidence that family (namely
children) is especially important for poor individuals10. The relation is, as expected, clearly
negative, decreasing sharply until income levels of 40.000 Euros and then stabilizing.
Ageing tends to deteriorate the width of social network: it both reduces the number
of friends and the number of relatives in the social network. However this reduction is
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Source: SHARE 4th wave, n=58.489
Figure 6: Social Network and Age
much sharper on the number of friends, because friends have generally a similar age, and
old people usually do not create new relations. With family members it is a bit different,
although it also declines with age (namely due to the death of parents and siblings), while
being a much smoother decline than for friends. Most of elder’s individuals family net is
composed by younger members (children) and sometimes with ageing new members may
enter in the family network (namely grandchildren).
Figure 6 shows that the share of children, in the total of the social network, experiments
an almost linear growth with ageing, reinforcing the direct positive relation between these
two variables
5 ‘Will you still need me? Will you still feed me?’
5.1 Financial Transfers and the Constitution of the Social Network
Table 3 presents the giver probit model results, with the five different equations described
in Section 4, and Table 4 the receiver results. We compute marginal effects and the
12
1st Regression 2nd Regression 3rd Regression
Giver ME Coef z ME Coef z ME Coef z
Family Net Members 0,036*** 26,02 0,037*** 26,77 0,035*** 25,11
Friend Net Members 0,06*** 28,45 0,055*** 25,48 0,041*** 18,96
Married 0,113*** 25,29 0,116*** 25,9 0,089*** 19,18
Gender -0,025*** -6,62 -0,024*** -6,33 -0,008** -1,98
Country
Austria reference reference
Germany 0,015 1,21 -0,029** -2,3
Sweden 0,06*** 5,31 0,021* 1,85
Netherlands -0,044*** -4,31 -0,09*** -8,62
Spain -0,242*** -22,39 -0,232*** -21,17
Italy 0,006 0,63 0,012 1,24
France -0,052*** -6,24 -0,095*** -11,19
Denmark 0,055*** 5,18 0,02* 1,87
Switzerland -0,04*** -4,33 -0,107*** -10,75
Belgium -0,054*** -6,3 -0,122*** -13,79
Czech 0,005 0,59 -0,016* -1,91
Poland -0,062*** -4,94 -0,049*** -3,88
Hungary -0,133*** -12,68 -0,135*** -12,67
Portugal -0,164*** -13,28 -0,133*** -10,66
Slovenia -0,101*** -9,25 -0,119*** -10,88





Less than 55 reference
From 55 to 64 0,006 0,97
From 65 to 75 -0,013** -2,07
75 and more -0,043*** -6,31
Source: SHARE 4th wave.
Number of observations: 58.489; Log likelihood -32.684.
Significance levels are, respectively, 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
Table 3: Giver: Regressions 1 to 3
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1st Regression 2nd Regression 3rd Regression
Receiver ME Coef z ME Coef z ME Coef z
Family Net Members 0,015*** 26,02 0,016*** 26,77 0,015*** 25,11
Friend Net Members 0,003 28,45 0,004** 25,48 0,014*** 18,96
Married -0,123*** 25,29 -0,121*** 25,9 -0,076*** 19,18
Gender 0,011*** -6,62 0,01*** -6,33 -0,003 -1,98
Country
Austria reference reference
Germany 0,051*** 1,21 0,028** -2,3
Sweden -0,001 5,31 -0,018* 1,85
Netherlands 0,019** -4,31 0,018** -8,62
Spain -0,013 -22,39 -0,048*** -21,17
Italy -0,017* 0,63 -0,035*** 1,24
France -0,013* -6,24 -0,038*** -11,19
Denmark 0,12*** 5,18 0,114*** 1,87
Switzerland -0,041*** -4,33 -0,056*** -10,75
Belgium 0,029*** -6,3 0,004 -13,79
Czech 0,12*** 0,59 0,11*** -1,91
Poland -0,036*** -4,94 -0,06*** -3,88
Hungary -0,01 -12,68 -0,033*** -12,67
Portugal -0,032*** -13,28 -0,055*** -10,66
Slovenia -0,08*** -9,25 -0,086*** -10,88





Less than 55 reference
From 55 to 64 -0,007 0,97
From 65 to 75 0,016** -2,07
75 and more 0,12*** -6,31
Source: SHARE 4th wave.
Number of observations: 58.489; Log likelihood -25.730.
Significance levels are, respectively, 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
Table 4: Receiver: Regressions 1 to 3
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3rd Regression 4th Regression
Giver ME Coef z ME Coef z
Children Net Members — — 0,039*** 20,05
Family Net Members 0,035*** 25,11 — —
Friend Net Members 0,041*** 18,96 0,04*** 18,32
Married 0,089*** 19,18 0,073*** 15,86
Gender -0,008** -1,98 -0,005 -1,35
Country
Austria reference reference
Germany -0,029** -2,3 -0,029** -2,33
Sweden 0,021* 1,85 0,017 1,53
Netherlands -0,09*** -8,62 -0,09*** -8,67
Spain -0,232*** -21,17 -0,235*** -21,47
Italy 0,012 1,24 0,008 0,83
France -0,095*** -11,19 -0,101*** -11,87
Denmark 0,02* 1,87 0,02* 1,85
Switzerland -0,107*** -10,75 -0,107*** -10,74
Belgium -0,122*** -13,79 -0,123*** -13,99
Czech -0,016* -1,91 -0,025*** -3
Poland -0,049*** -3,88 -0,055*** -4,38
Hungary -0,135*** -12,67 -0,135*** -12,7
Portugal -0,133*** -10,66 -0,133*** -10,68
Slovenia -0,119*** -10,88 -0,128*** -11,72
Estonia -0,077*** -9,23 -0,081*** -9,7
Income 1,24E-08*** 14,23 1,26E-08*** 14,54
Education 0,011*** 23,09 0,011*** 23,86
Symptoms 0,002** 2,34 0,003*** 2,64
Age
Less than 55 reference reference
From 55 to 64 0,006 0,97 0,000 -0,01
From 65 to 75 -0,013** -2,07 -0,021*** -3,51
75 and more -0,043*** -6,31 -0,055*** -8,01
Source: SHARE 4th wave.
Number of observations: 58.489; Log likelihood -32.684.
Significance levels are, respectively, 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
Table 5: Giver: Regressions 3 and 4
Z-values for each variable.
As it is expected, a larger social network increases very significantly the probability
both of being a giver and/or a receiver. This confirms the results in the literature (Stoeckel
et al., 2013). The effect is clearly higher for being a giver than for being a receiver.
Our results show a similar effect both from having friends or family members in the
social networks. However, it is interesting to note that, for being a receiver, friendnet
becomes significant only with the introduction of controls, in line with the preliminary
evidence in Figure 3 and Figure 5, suggesting that family works as the natural support for
cases of illness and poorness. Lower levels of education and ageing tend also to increase
the importance of the family.
The 4th Regression uses children instead of family members in the social network
without changing the coefficients signs or significance. Nonetheless, it is worth to refer
that the marginal effect childnet is higher, both for being a giver and a receiver, than the
coefficient famnet. This suggests that children constitute the most important part of the
family network in what concerns private financial transfers in both directions, as already
15
3rd Regression 4th Regression
Receiver ME Coef z ME Coef z
Children Net Members — — 0,017*** 10,78
Family Net Members 0,015*** 13,05 — —
Friend Net Members 0,014*** 7,24 0,013*** 6,96
Married -0,076*** -21,13 -0,083*** -23,35
Gender -0,003 -0,86 -0,002 -0,67
Country
Austria reference reference
Germany 0,028** 2,59 0,027** 2,57
Sweden -0,018* -1,74 -0,02* -1,91
Netherlands 0,018** 2,01 0,017* 1,94
Spain -0,048*** -5,61 -0,05*** -5,83
Italy -0,035*** -4,04 -0,036*** -4,2
France -0,038*** -5,09 -0,04*** -5,43
Denmark 0,114*** 13 0,114*** 12,97
Switzerland -0,056*** -6,25 -0,055*** -6,22
Belgium 0,004 0,6 0,004 0,52
Czech 0,11*** 15,61 0,107*** 15,1
Poland -0,06*** -5,32 -0,063*** -5,54
Hungary -0,033*** -3,68 -0,033*** -3,71
Portugal -0,055*** -5,23 -0,055*** -5,25
Slovenia -0,086*** -8,47 -0,089*** -8,81
Estonia 0,031*** 4,49 0,03*** 4,3
Income 2,95E-07*** 3,92 3,07E-08*** 4,09
Education 0 -1,05 0 -0,57
Symptoms 0,029*** 37,47 0,029*** 37,54
Less than 55 reference reference
From 55 to 64 -0,007 -1,39 -0,01* -1,86
From 65 to 75 0,016** 3,01 0,012** 2,26
75 and more 0,12*** 21,33 0,115*** 20,3
Source: SHARE 4th wave.
Number of observations: 58.489; Log likelihood -25.730.
Significance levels are, respectively, 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
Table 6: Receiver: Regressions 3 and 4
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obtained by Deindl and Brandt (2011) and Ogg and Renaut (2013).
The most relevant change brought by this substitution is the negative effect on the
three age groups coefficients (the decline is exponential) on both directions. This happens
because with ageing the number of siblings and parents on social network decreases and
the number of children on the social network increases.
5.2 Financial Transfers — Income, Education and Health
We considered wealth as the sum of the values of individual’s house, car, bank accounts
(including long term savings) and “other real estate”. income is the sum of pensions,
wages (both from employment and self-employment), lump sum payments, income from
rent and sublet and other regular payments. education is a variable that contains the
number of years that the individual spent studying.
As expected, richer people have a greater probability of being givers. Surprisingly the
effect, although smaller, is positive for being a receiver. This is related with the fact that
income and wealth are intrinsically related with other aspects, such as health, gender
and education; but income is also related with the number and strength of individuals’
social network: richer people tend to be more sociable, possibly due to the fact that they
spend on average more years working, and work is the common place to constitute a solid
social network (Borsch-Supan et al., 2013). Early retirement has a negative impact both
on wealth and pensions, and it undermines the social network.
As the literature refers, education plays also a very important role, since it clearly
augments the likelihood of being a giver, because more educated people tend to have more
ties, namely with friends (see Figure 4).
Health is one of the most important drivers for being a receiver (it has a very powerful
impact); and it has always a small positive, but significant impact for being a giver.
5.3 Financial Transfers and Age
The literature is very extensive on analysing the relations of informal private transfers
with age. The main results are as follows (Mudrazija, 2014): first, receipts increase with
age and gifts diminish; second, these two relations are not linear, but exponential; third
the effect and also the non-linearity are more evident on receipts than on gifts.
We have data only for individuals older than 50. We created four different groups
concerning age. In the first, which we used as a reference for our regression, we included
individuals aged less than 54; in the second we included individuals aged between 55 and
64; in the third we included individuals aged between 65 and 74; and in the fourth all
individuals aged 75 or more.11
In our results we confirm the three main claims concerning age:
• The effects are more significant for receivers than for givers;
• There is a non-linear behaviour, since there is not a significant difference from the
first to the second group both for receivers and givers. However, the third group has
already very significant signs for both independent variables. The impact increases
a lot in the last group: it is more than three times the coefficient of the third group
for givers, and for receivers it is more than seven times higher for being a receiver.
This shows not only that the effect is stronger for being a receiver, but the speed
11The same division is made in other papers (see, for example, Attias-Donfut et al. (2005)), one main
advantage of these scaling is the separation at the age of 65, which is the retirement age for the majority




































































Figure 7: Age and Financial Transfers
of the decrease with age is also much higher for being a receiver (this effects are
illustrated in Figure 7).12
5.4 Marriage and Gender
married is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the person is married and equal to 0 otherwise.
We found that being married increases very significantly the probability of being a giver.
This happens because marriage generally works as a safety net; secondly it tends to increase
social relations, considering that married people tend to be more socially pro-active and
to have more members in social networks (see Appendix 1); a third explanation may be
related with individual’s values.
Nevertheless, being married significantly decreases the probability of being a receiver,
but this does not constitute a surprise, since marriage works as a safety net and we did
not consider as financial private gifts inter-spousal transfers13. This supports and gives
strength to the argument that receiving financial gifts is mainly related with particular
necessities, for which marriage works as a safety net.
If we consider childnet, instead of family members, the significance of marriage de-
creases, possibly due to collinearity between the marriage dummy and the number of
children (married people tend to have more children). There is also an effect pointed out
by Albertini et al. (2010), that divorced parents tend to have less relations with their
children and this reinforces the difference in the coefficients.
gender is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for women and equal to 0 for men.
The introduction of new control variables, income, wealth and education, strongly reduces
gender significance, namely on the probability of being a receiver – this follows what is
expected, since gender is negatively correlated with these three controls (see Appendix 2).
Moreover, controlling for income, education and wealth, reduces gender significance.
On the probability of being a giver, the coefficient is still significant at 95%, indicating
that women are less likely to being money givers than men, even controlling for income
and education.
12In the Appendix 4 we also present regressions that use age squared and some figures, showing non
linearity behaviours on both gifts and receipts.
13Indeed SHARE does not collect these data. It is most likely impossible to collect these data, because
most spouses live with common resources.
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Figure 8: Age and Financial Transfers
5.5 Country Dummies
We estimated country dummies, which we will use to grasp the relationship between
private financial transfers and family values. Table 7 contains the marginal values of the
3rd regression on Section 5 of the country dummies estimated in each of the regressions
(giver and receiver). For simplicity, in what follows, we refer to these as country impacts.
Figure 8 relates giver and receiver country impacts. It shows that geography plays its
role in determining similarities across countries. In order to be able to create this set of
dummies we choose Austria as the reference country (we considered the average values for
the axis).
As is suggested by Stoeckel et al. (2013) people from different countries have different
interpersonal solidarities.
Country impact do not change radically with the introduction of income, age, and
education controls. In the probit concerning givers, only Germany coefficient changes its
sign with the introduction of controls. Sweden and Denmark loose their positive signifi-



















Table 8: Country Values Index
controls.
As for the probit concerning receivers, the introduction of controls gives significance
to the marginal effects of the Sweden, Spain, and Hungary dummies; only Belgium looses
its significance.
Southern European Countries have the lowest country impacts both for giving and re-
ceiving money, with Spain representing the most extreme case, although Portugal, France,
Slovenia, Hungary and Switzerland are also part of this group. The only Southern Euro-
pean Country missing in this group is Italy.
The countries that have the highest propensity to participate in financial private trans-
fers are located mainly in Central Europe: Denmark, Germany, Austria and Czech Re-
public, being Estonia the only non Central European country.
6 Family Values
6.1 The 5th Regression — Countries Values
We capture family values by the answer to the following question: “Do you think that
marriage is outdated?” There are only two possible answers: agree or disagree. Then we
create a dummy based on this question equal to 1 for disagreeing, and equal to 0 otherwise.
With this variable we create an index value based on the mean value per country. That is,
the index gives us the share of people in a given country who do not think that marriage
is outdated. Thus, using this index, we are able to characterize the 16 countries.
We expect that country impacts are positively and significantly related to values index;
if so we can say that family values influence private financial transfers. Table 8 presents
the value of the FVI for each country.
We find that indeed there is a positive relation between country impacts and the
FVI. However, this relation is much stronger for givers than for receivers. This suggests
that family values have a greater impact on gifts provided by elder population than on






















































Likelihood of being a Receiver and Family Values Index
 
 























































































Figure 10: Likelihood of being a Giver and Family Values Index
elder private financial receipts are related essentially with cases of necessity, thus we do
not expect that values have on them such a great influence. With respect to gifts there
are other aspects playing its role, namely culture, family strength, altruism and generosity
—that is— values.
As a robustness check, we run our last regression, where country dummies are replaced
by the FVI on the baseline specification (3rd regression in Section 5). In addition, we run
an additional regression where the FVI is interacted with the following covariates: famnet,
friendnet, married, gender, income, education, symptoms and age. Table 9 presents
the results for givers and table 10 for receivers. Our objective is to test whether or not
family values mediate the relationship between private transfers and these covariates.
Comparing with our 3rd regression, in what concerns givers, the introduction of
this new explanatory variable did not change any coefficient sign, although gender and
symptoms lost their significance. In the case of receivers, there was also no changes on
the sign of the coefficients, and education gained significance.
As we expected our transformations did not create considerable changes in the be-
haviour of our variables. The FVI is positive and strongly significant both for givers
and receivers. This confirms that our values index is reliable; this is: family values are
important on determining private financial transfers.
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3rd Regression 5th Regression
Giver ME Coef z ME Coef z
Family Net Members 0,035*** 25,11 0,035*** 25,09
Friend Net Members 0,041*** 18,96 0,045*** 20,59
Married 0,089*** 19,18 0,086*** 18,48


















Income 1,24E-06*** 14,23 1,36E-08*** 16,69
Education 0,011*** 23,09 0,011*** 26,42
Symptoms 0,002** 2,34 0,001 0,57
Age
Less than 55 reference reference
From 55 to 64 0,006 0,97 0,008 1,39
From 65 to 75 -0,013** -2,07 -0,005 -0,9
75 and more -0,043*** -6,31 -0,039*** -5,71
Countries Values Index 0,044*** 14,53
Source: SHARE 4th wave.
Number of observations: 58.489; Log likelihood -32.684.
Significance levels are, respectively, 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
Table 9: Giver: Regressions 3 and 5
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3rd Regression 5th Regression
Receiver ME Coef z ME Coef z
Family Net Members 0,015*** 13,05 0,014*** 12,19
Friend Net Members 0,014*** 7,24 0,014*** 7,37
Married -0,076*** -21,13 -0,08*** -26


















Income 2,95E-07*** 3,92 2,47E-07*** 3,44
Education 0 -1,05 0,002*** 6,86
Symptoms 0,029*** 37,47 0,029*** 38,43
Age
Less than 55 reference reference
From 55 to 64 -0,007 -1,39 -0,01* -1,86
From 65 to 75 0,016** 3,01 0,015** 2,78
75 and more 0,12*** 21,33 0,119*** 21,13
Countries Values Index 0,033*** 12,87
Source: SHARE 4th wave.
Number of observations: 58.489; Log likelihood -25.730.
Significance levels are, respectively, 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).




As ageing becomes more and more a concern there are many studies suggesting the im-
portance of intergenerational financial transfers. The literature also proclaims that family
plays the major role on private financial transfers. In this work we analyse the relations
between these kind of transfers and family values.
We find that the extension of the social network highly influences the probability of
either being a giver, or being a receiver. Family members, namely children, are the main
financial supporters of elderly individuals. Family is especially important for helping in the
most adverse conditions, such as infirmity, advanced age and poorness. After controlling
for income, education, age and health there are still clear differences between countries,
suggesting that values play an important role on explaining private financial transfers.
This hypothesis was strengthened when we crossed our data with a family values index.
Particularity gifts find a close relation with values. This confirmed that receipts are
more related with necessitous situations and other factors exogenous to values. This was
confirmed by the fact that marriage works as a strong safety net for these cases, since
it decreases abruptly the likelihood of being a receiver. The demography crisis obligates
Europe to rethink very seriously upon the importance of intergenerational transfers. Poli-
cies that complement and take advantage from family relations may conduce to a more
efficient and fair outcome for all generations.
7.2 Further Research
There are many aspects which could be studied in more depth, which may help to under-
stand better the drivers of intergenerational transfers. More steps can be taken to relate
family values with private financial transfers.
For example, it is possible to take a similar path, in order to study private time transfers
and its relation with family values.
EVS is a very wide and diverse questionnaire, thus the relation that we established
with family values, can also be made with religious beliefs, or with political positions, or
with other kind of social views.
Much more could be done if there was a questionnaire that crosses values evaluations
(like EVS) with more detailed profile description of individuals (like SHARE). It could
be interesting to analyse a plot of more countries from different continents and cultures.
There is also the possibility of making a longitudinal analysis, comparing the evolution of
financial transfers’ drivers across time.
Finally, it may be interesting and useful to analyse the relation between family values
and public intergenerational transfers. A research that relates the characterization of
welfare and pension regimes with individuals’ values may be important to have a more
complete vision on the relation between values and financial relations across generations.
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